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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
K. RUSSELL MYERS
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

TAWNYA MYERS (LUKE)
Defendant/Respondent

Civil No. D 85-1828

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 782a-3(g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On October 14, 1986, the defendant filed a Motion for Order
Permitting Minors to Leave State to permit her to move from the
State of Utah with the parties1 minor children.

On December 23,

1987 the plaintiff filed a Motion for Immediate Change of Custody
and Determination of Contempt against defendant.
Motions was held on February 10, 1987.

A trial on both

The plaintiff/appellant

has filed this appeal from the decision denying the plaintiff's
motion and granting the defendant's rendered by the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding as announced after trial in
open court on February 26, 1987.

ISSUES PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT
1.

Did the trial court err by allowing the defendant to

maintain her residence in the State of Washington with the
parties' minor children and was that move and change of locale
part of the Court's determination that

for the Defendant to

maintain custody of the children was in the said children's best
interests?
2.

Did the trial court err in awarding defendant custody of

the parties' minor children?
3.

Did the trial court err by not finding the Defendant in

contempt for leaving the State of Utah without court approval?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In May of 1985 an action for divorce was filed by the
Plaintiff. (R. 2) One of the issues raised in said complaint was
that of custody of the parties two minor children.
evaluations were completed by Kim Peterson

Custody

(Ex. 3-P) and

psychological evaluations were performed by Barbara Liebrocer.
(Ex. 4-P)

Kim Peterson recommended that custody be awarded to

Defendant (Tawnya) stating that the Plaintiff (Russ)
"has a history of infidelity and data
indicates he is abusive when pushed to
the limits. . . . Tawnya has been more
involved with the children and has been
the primary caretaker. The bonding
between Melanie and her mother appears
to be stronger, and she seems to prefer
living with her mother.
Since Tawnya has been in the role
of primary parent and given her relative
2

strengths as well as the perceived bonding
between her and the children, it is
recommended custody remain with the mother
. . . To disrupt the current situation
without evidence that the children would be
better off with Russ is clearly not in the
children's best interest. (Ex. 3-P)
Dr. Liebroder did not examine the children and thus was "not
in a position to assess which parent is better able to met the
needs11 of the children though stating it was "preferable to avoid
the disruption of a change in custody."

(Ex. 4-P)

On the date

of trial the parties entered into a stipulation which was made
part of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce.

(R. 99-118)

As part of the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce the parties agreed that
the Defendant would be awarded the custody of the parties' minor
children and she would reside within 50 miles of Salt Lake County
and that she would not move from the area without the permission
of the Plaintiff or of the Court.

(R. 100-101)

On or about August 14, 1986 the Defendant caused to be
served on the Plaintiff a Motion for permission to move from the
State of Utah with the children.

(R. 138)

The matter was set

for hearing twice in the month of October, 1986 but was continued
so that custody evaluations could be performed.

(Tr. 3-5)

On or about December 13, 1986, after attempting on numerous
occasions without success to contact Plaintiff's counsel to
obtain permission to leave the State of Utah, and after the
hearing set for December 12, 1986 was continued (the
continuance)

third such

the Defendant moved to Washington with the parties1
3

minor children.

(Tr. 185, 176-178)

On or about December 23, 1986 the Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Immediate Change of Custody and Determination of Contempt.
(R. 153)

All issues made part of said motion were reserved for

time of trial.

(R. 159-162)

Trial was held on February 10, 1982. Dr. Barbara Liebroder,
Kim Peterson, Tawnya Luke, Garth Luke, and Russell Myers
testified at the trial.
The Defendant, Mrs. Luke, testified that she left without
Court order because she had not been able to contact counsel to
obtain permission.

She testified that she had lost her job in

Salt Lake County, that she had no income since the Plaintiff had
refused to pay child support, the last payment having been
received on November 3, 1986.

The Plaintiff further testified

that she was residing with her parents and driving 120 miles
every day to ensure that her daughter regained in school.

She

had given up her apartment in anticipation of the December court
date.

Mrs Luke was at the time of her departure for Washington

in her third trimester of pregnancy and was anxious to move to
Washington where her husband was working.

(Tr. 176-178)

Mr. Luke, the husband of the Defendant, testified that the
income he was able to earn in the State of Washington allowed the
Defendant now to stay home full-time and be a full-time caretaker
of the children.

(Tr. 188)

Dr. Liebroder recommended that custody of the children be
awarded to the plaintiff because she stated that Defendant's
4

stability

had deteriorated

significant gains.

and that Plaintiff

had made

However Dr. Liebroder acknowledged that

Plaintiff had problems with immaturity, difficulty controlling
his temper, and had a history of sexual acting out.

(Tr. 24)

She further acknowledged that if the Plaintiff were granted
custody the children would require babysitters (Tr. 57)

and that

her concerns regarding the parties1 minor child, Nathan, and his
aggression may have been causing by his observing the Plaintiff
abuse the Defendant.

(Tr. 60)

During her testimony Dr.

Liebroder acknowledged that the stresses which were indicated in
her recent testing of the Defendant may have been caused by
Defendant's pregnancy, living with her parents, unemployment, and
her separation from her husband.

(Tr. 58, 86)

Dr. Liebroder

agreed that the Defendant/Respondent had been the primary
caretaker during the marriage and the children had a strong bond
to their mother.

(Tr. 80-82)

Further Dr. Liebroder testified

that the Plaintiff had rehabilitated himself through therapy but
that he was not currently married nor had the custody of the
children and therefore was not under any stress from such.
24, 50, 63).

(Tr.

However Plaintiff was anticipating being married

and had a profile inconsistent with marital stability.

(Tr. 63)

Also the minor child Nathan had expressed to Dr. Liebroder fears
of separation from his mother.

(Tr. 54)

Kim Peterson reported that in is opinion the Defendant
should maintain custody of the parties1 minor children.
(Ex. 1-P)

He stated that it is difficult to tell if the
5

Plaintiff will revert to his past history of sexual acting out
and abusive behavior if again placed in a position of stress as a
result of marriage.

(Tr. 127)

Mr. Peterson testified that the

fact that the Defendant can now be with the children essentially
24 hours a day weighed heavily in his recommendation that she
retain custody.

(Tr. 128)

He further noted that the bond with

mother is stronger and that she had been the primary caretaker.
(Tr. 128-129)

Mr. Peterson stated that in weighing the two

possibilities of either having the Defendant come back to Utah
and financially have to resume full-time employment or having the
Defendant stay in Washington and be a full-time caretaker, the
better circumstance would be that the Defendant stay in
Washington and be a full-time mother.

Mr. Peterson stated that

he had intentionally not reviewed the reports of Dr. Liebroder
because his report was to be independent of Dr. Liebroder f s.
(Tr. 143, 144)
The trial court, by and through the Honorable Judge Michael
Murphy, ruled that it would be in the best interests of the
children for the Defendant to maintain custody of the children
and the Court in awarding custody to the Defendant took into
account the fact that the children would continue to reside out
of the State of Utah.

Judge Murphy stated when announcing his

ruling in open court on February 26, 1987, "I did not condition
the order on Mrs. Luke's residing in Utah.

To the extent I can I

don't want to create additional marital problems and I just donft
think that is appropriate.'1

(Tr. 212)
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Judge Murphy also

required, and went to great lengths to ensure, that modification
of visitation was made to allow continued visitation rights for
the Plaintiff out of the State of Utah, and even apportioned
responsibility for the costs of transporting the children from
state to state between the parties.

(Tr. 205-208)

The Defendant/Respondent considers the following Findings of
Fact probative in her response to the appeal filed by the
Plaintiff/Appellant:
4.

Defendant filed a Motion for Permission to Leave the

State of Utah based on defendants husband's employment, but when
the hearing of said motion was continued, defendant removed
herself and the minor children to the State of Washington without
the court's permission and in knowing violation of the Order of
this Court.
5.

As a further and changed circumstance, the plaintiff has

undergone therapy in an effort to improve the emotional problems
he was advised existed when the original custody evaluations were
performed.
6.

Plaintiff has acted in the best interests of the

children of the parties.
7. Defendant's stability has degenerated since the entry of
the Decree of Divorce herein, a large part of which degeneracy
has been caused by post-divorce problems.
8.

Dr. Barbara Liebroder has conducted psychological and

custodial evaluations on the parties, their children, the husband
of defendant and the girlfriend of plaintiff, and concluded it
7

would be in the best interests of the parties1 minor children for
the plaintiff to be awarded the care, custody and control of said
minor children even though the minor children are bonded to the
defendant, the defendant has been primary caretaker of said
children and can spend more time with said children.
9.

Kim Peterson, MSW, LCSW, recommended that it would be in

the best interests of the parties1 minor children for the
defendant to retain custody of the said minor children based upon
the findings of plaintiff's prior conduct and psychological
reports, and based upon the defendant's being a full-time
caretaker, having bonded with said children, and to avoid
unnecessary trauma to the children of a change of custodial
parent.

He also recommended that the first choice of action in

the best interest of the children would be that they remain in
Salt Lake City, Utah with the defendant as their custodial
parent.

If that was not the order of the court, then it was

slightly better that they remain in the custody of the Defendant
and reside in Washington than if custody was transferred to
plaintiff.
10.

The court finds that the parties1 minor child, Nathan,

is hyperactive and is in need of therapy and that continued
psychological reports of Nathan's progress should be provided to
the court and to plaintiff.
11.

It is reasonable that the parties should equally divide

the cost of therapy for the minor child, Nathan.
12.

The court finds that both parents are fit and proper
8

persons to be awarded custody of said minor children.
13.

The court finds that it is in the best interest of the

parties1 minor children to remain in the custody of the defendant
who is a full-time caretaker and who has bonded with said
children, and that it would not be in the best interest of said
children to change custody.
17.

The plaintiff should be awarded a specific minimum

visitation schedule with the parties1 minor children based upon
said children residing out of the State of Utah as follows:
a.
reasonable

Monthly visitation of at least one weekend with
prior notice, no less than two weeks before

visitation;
b.

Two (2) months during the summer, upon sixty (60)

days prior notice;
c.

Christmas vacation commencing the day before

Christmas Day and the day after Christmas Day on alternating
years running until January 2nd of each year;
d.

Alternate Thanksgiving or Easter Holiday visitation

with plaintiff electing which holiday to commence with in 1987;
e.

Holiday vacations should be upon prior notice of at

least thirty (30) days;
f.

Prior notice of intent to exercise visitation

should be made in writing;
g.

The Plaintiff should be entitled to free telephone

access to the parties1 minor children.
18.

It is reasonable that the defendant should notify the
9

plaintiff when the parties' minor children are visiting with the
children's grandparents in Salt Lake City, Utah so that plaintiff
may visit with said children during such visits.
21 .

The court finds that plaintiff is past due in the

payment of his child support obligation for the months of
December, 1986 and January and February, 1987.
22.

The defendant should be granted judgment against the

plaintiff in the sum of $1,350.00 (retroactive from court date)
for said past due support, provided that no execution should be
issued on said judgment as long as the plaintiff makes his
ordered child support payments each month plus $100.00 on the
arrearage until it is paid in full.
26.

Plaintiff's motion to hold defendant in contempt should

be denied.
These conditions were incorporated into the Court's Order.
(R. 185 and 188)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I
Pursuant to stipulation an Order was entered by the Court
requiring

the Defendant to petition the Court to move the

children from the State of Utah.

A Motion for Permission to

Leave the State of Utah was served upon Plaintiff by the
Defendant in August, 1986. The matter was heard before the Court
in February, 1987. The Plaintiff/Appellant argues that the trial
court erred in awarding custody of the children to the Defendant
10

w i t h o u t d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t the move was in the c h i l d r e n ' s best
interest.
did

Defendant/Respondent

indeed

consider

contends t h a t the t r i a l

court

t h e move and in i t s F i n d i n g s of

Fact

considered the move in determining and finding t h a t i t was in the
best i n t e r e s t s of the children for them to remain in the custody
of the Defendant.

The Court s u b s t a n t i a l l y modified and included

provisions

out-of-state

for

transportation

showing

there

visitation
was

and

costs

an u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of
and

c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the o u t - o f - s t a t e move in determining the best
i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d r e n .
The t r i a l
Defendant.

c o u r t did not e r r in awarding custody to the

The t r i a l court has broad d i s c r e t i o n in determining

the best i n t e r e s t s of c h i l d r e n .
Point II
The t r i a l court did not e r r in not finding the Defendant in
contempt

under

the

Defendant was under.
of j o b , f a i l u r e

exigent

and c i r c u m s t a n c e s

the

The continued court d a t e s , pregnancy,

loss

of P l a i n t i f f

stresses

to pay support,

separation from

husband, loss of residence and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of the children 120
miles per

day to school, a l l placed the Defendant under extreme

s t r e s s d u r i n g the p e r i o d between August and December,

1986.

F u r t h e r t h e Defendant exhibited her willingness to comply with
the Court order by f i l i n g her motion for permission and waiting
for a period of four months for a hearing to take place.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT CONFORMED WITH
AND COMPLIED WITH THE STIPULATION MADE
PART OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND THE
COURT CONSIDERED THE MOVE OF THE DEFENDANT
AND THE PARTIES1 CHILDREN IN DETERMINING
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN AND
ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
CUSTODY TO THE DEFENDANT.
The Appellant argues that the Court failed to make a finding
of best interests of the children to be located out of the State
of Utah.

Appellant argues that this matter came on for hearing

as a result of his Motion for Immediate Change of Custody and
Determination of Contempt.

Respondent contends that this matter

was heard as a result of the filing of her Motion to Move from
the

State

of

Utah

filed

three

month's

before

Plaintiff /Appellant' s Motion and some two and one-half (2 1/2)
months before the Defendant/Respondent left the State of Utah.
The

Defendant/Respondent

did not attempt

to avoid

the

requirements of the stipulation and Decree that she procure a
court order before being permitted to move.

Immediately upon

determining that her husband had to relocate out of the State of
Utah, Defendant/Respondent served upon Plaintiff, in August,
1986, a Motion to Move as required by the Decree of Divorce.
This matter had been set for hearing three times and continued
three times before Plaintiff filed his Motion for Custody and
Contempt.
Appellant cites the precedents incorporated in Despain vs.
Despain 627 P.2d. 526 (Utah 1980) and Kinsman v. Kinsman 73 Utah
12

Adv. Rep. 110 (January 12, 1988).

In Despain the modification

filed by the Respondent dealt with the value of a trust fund. In
Kinsman the court dealt with a stipulated waiver of alimony
incorporated in a divorce decree.

In these cases the petitioner

moved that the court disregard previous stipulations entered into
by the parties.

In this case at hand the Defendant/Respondent

did not move that the court disregard the stipulation.

She

specifically complied with the Court order in moving and having
heard a Motion to move out of the State as required by the
parties1 stipulation which stated:
"That she would not move from that
area without either the permission of the
plaintiff or the Court obtained by
petitioning the court for permission to
leave the area and establishing that such
move would be in the best interests of the
children after evaluation by follow-up
evaluation to be performed by Kim Peterson.'1
(R. 100, 101 and 111)
Follow-up evaluations were performed by Kim Peterson and Dr.
Liebroder as required under the terms of the stipulation.

Both

evaluators testified at the hearing held in February, 1987 and
the Court had the benefit of said testimony in making its
determination.

The Defendant/Respondent transported and provided

the children and submitted herself and her husband to all testing
and evaluations required by the evaluators appointed by the
Court.
As a result of the stipulation entered into by the parties a
determination of what would be in the best interests of the
children was required be made by the Court.
13

By its action the trial court fulfills the proper standard
for reviewing a change of custody as set out in Hogue v. Hogue,
649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).

The standard requires that the trial

court first determine whether there has been a substantial and
material change in the circumstances which justifies reopening
the question of custody.

Id at 54.

If this issue is resolved in

the affirmative, the Court then proceeds to decide whether

the

requested change in custody will best serve the welfare of the
child.

Id.

Under U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5(3), as amended, a divorce court
sits as a court of equity so far as child custody is concerned.
The trial court is afforded particularly broad discretion in the
area of child custody.

In Hirsh v. Hirsh, 725 P.2d 132, (Ut.

1986), the Supreme Court states that a determination of the "best
interests of the child11 turns on factors which the trial court is
best able to assess, and only when the action taken by the trial
court is so unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion should
this Court substitute its own judgment.
In Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Ut. App. 1987), the
Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion
when awarding a former husband visitation, by failing to make
findings in the best interests of the children.

The Supreme

Court based its decision on the fact that the trial court's
findings were silent on the best interests of the children with
regard to the visitation schedule.

Moreover, the Court only

makes mention of the intended move without any findings as to
14

whether the move would be in the childrens1 best interest.

Id.

at 1023.
The trial court deficiencies alluded to in Ebbert are not
repeated in the case before you.

The trial court, in acting on

respondent's Motion for Permission to Leave the State and
appellant's Motion for Modification of the Divorce Decree
commissioned a custody evaluation to be conducted by Kim Peterson
and a psychological evaluation by Dr. Barbara Liebroder.

Both

witnesses had been associated with the parties in question since
May 20, 1985 when the Appellant initiated the Complaint for
dissolution of the parties' marriage, and were properly qualified
to testify and aid the Court in determining the best interests of
the children.
Kim Peterson's report recommended that it would be in the
best interest of the parties' children for the Respondent to
retain custody of the children.

Mr. Peterson based his

recommendation on the strong bond formed between the children and
their mother given her full-time caretaker status.

He also

stated that it would avoid unnecessary trauma to the children of
a change of custodial parent.

His report also took into account

the move from one state to another since he concluded that the
ideal situation would be that they remain in Utah with

the

respondent as custodial parent but if that was not the order of
the court, then it was slightly better that they remain in the
custody of respondent and reside in Washington than if custody
was transferred to appellant. (R. 174).
15

All the above reasons

and recommendations were echoed by the Court in the Findings.
There are ample reasons and evidence upon which the Court's
Findings were based.

In child custody determinations, the trial

court's decision should be upheld on appeal unless the trial
court's action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse
of discretion.

Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981).

The evidence in this case clearly shows the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.

Dr. Liebroder and Mr. Peterson

acknowledged that the Defendant had been the primary caretaker of
the children and both acknowledged that the children were bonded
to the defendant mother.

The evidence showed that due to the

move the defendant was now able to stay home and take care of the
children on a full-time basis.

The evaluators both testified

that the plaintiff had a history of sexual acting out, abusive
behavior and marital instability which might surface if exposed
to ongoing stresses of remarriage or custody of the children,
stresses he was not exposed to while undergoing testing and
therapy.

Point II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT HOLD
RESPONDENT IN CONTEMPT FOR HER FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE PARTIES' STIPULATION.
The Decree of Divorce entered in this matter on June 9, 1986
awards the custody of the children to the respondent provided she
remain in and reside within the jurisdiction of the Court.

In

order to leave the State of Utah, the respondent filed a Motion
16

for Permission to Leave the State of Utah based on her husband's
employment in the State of Washington,

Mr. Kim Peterson's

evaluation supports the grounds for the Motion when he finds that
respondent's husband worked in Seattle, Washington for a year and
one-half as a sales manager and earned $42,000.00 per year.

A

return to Utah would cut is income in half and this would mean
that respondent would have to seek employment thus depriving her
of her full-time caretaker status as a mother.

(Ex. 1)

Respondent's Motion for Permission to Leave the State was
continued on numerous occasions.

At no time during the

proceedings did respondent's actions impair the course of the
process or hamper the Court's mandated evaluations.

Throughout

respondent attempted to fulfill all obligations by appearing in
Court and having the children available.

"One who puts forth

every reasonable effort to comply with the court order, but is
unable to do so, is not guilty of contempt on account of such
failure." Limb v. Limb, 113 Utah 385, 195 P.2d 263 (1948).
By analogy, Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969) seems
to illustrate the powers of the trial court.

In Butler, even

though the evidence strongly suggested Plaintiff's failure and
refusal in every respect to cooperate with Defendant's efforts to
see his children pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree, the
Court did not hold the Plaintiff in contempt.

Though Butler

stands for the proposition that the "duty to hold contempt in a
civil matter in order to afford relief to another party does not
lie within the discretion of the trial court," Id at 729, the
17

trial judge is in a better position than the Supreme Court to
make a determination in the matter.

Id at 728*

The trial court

is obviously best situated to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, and this court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court on a disputed factual issue.

Hughes v.

Stusser, 415 P.2d 89 (Utah 1963).
The trial court heard evidence that the Defendant/Respondent
was under extreme stresses and circumstances during the period
before her move out of state, including the continuance of
hearings on her Motion for Permission to Leave, the loss of her
employment, her pregnancy, the failure of Plaintiff/Appellant to
pay support, separation from her husband, loss of residence and
subsequent residence with her parents, and the transporting of
her daughter 120 miles each day to attend the same school.
taking

such

evidence

into

considering

and

In

denying

Plaintiff/Appellantfs Motion to find Defendant/Respondent in
contempt of Court the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based

upon

the

Defendant/Respondent
findings

foregoing
herein

points

requests

and r u l i n g s of t h e t r i a l

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s

this

and

authorities,

Court

t o uphold

the

court.
*f

d a y of A p r i l ,

1988.

HASKINS
for Defendant/Respondent
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